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Abstract
One major function of social networks (e.g., massive online
social networks) is the dissemination of information, such as
scientific knowledge, news, and rumors. Information can be
propagated by the users of the network via natural connec-
tions in written, oral or electronic form. The information
passing from a sender to receivers and back (in the form of
comments) involves all of the actors considering their knowl-
edge, trust, and popularity, which shape their publishing
and commenting strategies. To understand such human as-
pects of the information dissemination, we propose a game
theoretical model of a one-way information forwarding and
feedback mechanism in a star-shaped social network that
takes into account the personalities of the communicating
actors.
1 INTRODUCTION AND PRIOR WORK
A social network is a collection of actors (network members)
connected with links—indicators of proximity. One major
function of social networks is information and innovation
diffusion. Information represents scientific knowledge, news,
rumors, etc. [7, 9, 12, 13]. As an important form of social
organization, information can shape public opinion, inform
and misinform the society, cause panic in a society, promote
products, etc. [9]. It is disseminated by the members of the
network via natural connections in written, oral or electronic
form.
Due to its importance, information diffusion has been
one of the focuses in social network research. For example,
theories of rumor spreading are proposed by Zanette [13] and
Nekovee et al. [9]. Game theoretical approach to informa-
tion propagation (namely, to learning) has been suggested
by Gale & Kariv [5] and Acemoglu et al. [1]. Ellwardt &
van Duijn explored gossiping in small organizational social
networks [4]. Since information dissemination and other var-
ious social network activities are supported by the structural
organization of social networks, social network topology re-
ceives a lot of research attention. An effect of network topol-
ogy on the information diffusion was observed by Hirshman
& Carley [6]: sparse networks are more effective for infor-
mation entrance, and clustered (cellular) network structure
decreases information diffusion.
In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for
the one-way information passing from a selected member of
a social network (the sender, the speaker) to his immedi-
ate network neighborhood (the friend list, the “first circle,”
the receivers or the listeners). The novelty of our model is
that psychological characteristics are explicitly modeled in
information dissemination. In our model, information pass-
ing intrinsically involves all parties considering their psy-
chological characteristics: self-perceived knowledge, trust,
and popularity—which further determine their decisions of
whether or not to forward the information and whether or
not to provide feedback (comments).
Feedback in information dissemination is explicitly con-
sidered as strategic moves in our game theoretical model.
Related to our work, Lampe et al. [7] also analyzed the
mechanism of feedback, its influence on the members of on-
line communities, and its role in learning transfer. Similar
concept of social influence, but in the context of community
building, has been researched by Crandall et al. [3].
This paper is an extension of the results described by
Zinoviev et al. [14, 15]. In the first original paper [15], we
presented an analysis of a one-directional atomic peer-to-
peer communication, where one actor is a speaker (he sends
a message) and the other is a listener (and optionally a
commenter—she receives the message and sends a reply),
and the comment, if any, is indivisible from the original
message. In the second paper [14], we removed the one-
way limitation and allowed two actors to communicate in a
full duplex mode, when either or both actors are speaking,
listening, and commenting at the same time.
In this paper, the two-way peer-to-peer model is replaced
by a one-way atomic broadcast (“friendcast”), which is a
more realistic scenario in massive online social networks.
Examples of broadcast include wall posts in Facebook with
follow-up comments, blog posts (with comments) in Live-
Journal and Blogger, and tweets in Twitter. Additionally,
we reorganized the knowledge model by introducing knowl-
edge forgetfulness, willingness to learn, and fuzzy measures
of knowledge and belief. We also present some early ex-
perimental evidence of the correlation between a speaker’s
posting rate and his popularity among the listeners.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the overview of the model. Section 3 introduces
the knowledge and feedback transfer mechanisms. Section 4
describes the organization of the game matrix. Some simula-
tion results illustrating the model are presented in Section 5.
Finally, section 6 outlines the key results and future research
directions.
2 MODEL OVERVIEW
The proposed model consists of five major components: the
network model, the knowledge model, the popularity model,
the trust model, and the utility definition. Once the utility
is defined for all actors, standard game theoretical methods
are applied to calculate the optimal strategies for the actors.
2.1 Network Configuration
We consider a star-shaped network with one hub (the sender
or the speaker, S) connected to a collection of N indepen-
dent receivers (listeners, Ri). The connections are bidi-
rectional: new information propagates from the sender to
the receivers, and feedback (if any) propagates from the re-
ceivers to the sender (Figure 1).
If the sender decides to share information with the neigh-
bors, then the information is shared with all N receivers
at once. Individual receivers may choose to respond to the
broadcast message or not, depending on their optimal strate-
gies. We assume that if the receivers respond, they do so
in the order of their position in the sender’s friend list (the
first friend responds first, followed by the second one, etc.).
No further messages are sent by S until all receivers respond
or indicate their unwillingness to respond. The composition
of the sender’s friend list does not change while the message
exchange is in progress. In this sense, the information dif-
fusion model described in the paper is an atomic broadcast
(“friendcast”).
2.2 Knowledge Model
We represent knowledge as a finite collection of enumerated
elementary assertions A = {Ai} (a knowledge base). For
example, A0 = “the world is flat” is an assertion, and so
is A1 = “the world is round.” The meaning of the word
“elementary” is application-specific. The model can operate
at the level of data (facts), information (processed facts) or
knowledge (patterns) [11]. Each individual in the system
knows from 0 to |A| assertions from the collection.
In contrast to our previous model [14, 15], an assertion
in the new model is a two-component tuple Ai = {ki, bi},
0 ≤ ki ≤ 1, −1 ≤ bi ≤ 1. The first element of the tuple, ki,
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Figure 1: Communication between the sender S and the
receivers Ri.
is the quantitative measure of knowledge. The quantity of
1 represents full knowledge of the assertion. The quantity
of 0 represents no knowledge. A value of 0 < ki < 1 corre-
sponds to partial knowledge (such as “I know some quantum
physics”).
The second element of the tuple, bi, is the self-perceived
quality of the assertion, or the belief associated with the
assertion. The belief of 1 represents a true self-perceived
fact (“I believe that the world is round”); the belief of -1
represents a false fact (“I do not believe that the world is
flat”); the belief of 0 represents an assertion whose correct-
ness cannot be established, or a rumor (“There may be no
life on Alpha Centauri”).
As an example, assertion “I know some astrology, but I
don’t really believe in it” may look like Ai = {0.3,−0.9}.
The value of an assertion is the product of the knowledge
and the belief: ai = ki × bi. We propose that the average
knowledge K of an actor characterizes the actor’s ability to
apply reasoning to unknown assertions:
K = |ai|, 0 ≤ K ≤ 1. (1)
Ontology
Some assertions in the knowledge base may be interdepen-
dent (correlated or anti-correlated). The |A| × |A| matrix
M, −1 ≤ mij ≤ 1, mii = 1, represents the correlations be-
tween assertions. We call M an ontology matrix. mij is the
correlation coefficient between Ai and Aj : the change of be-
lief in Ai may cause a change of belief in Aj , ∆bj = mij∆bi.
For example, m01 = m10 = −1 for the “world” assertions
mentioned above. In general, mij 6= mji.
Knowledge Dynamics
Two new elements of the current model are an individual’s
forgetfulness and willingness to learn.
We propose that knowledge of an individual deteriorates
over time. At each time step,
ki,t+1 =
√
ζ ki,t; bi,t+1 =
√
ζ bi,t; i = 1 . . . |A|, (2)
where 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 is a measure of remembrance. ζ = 1 rep-
resents no forgetfulness (no knowledge deterioration); ζ = 0
represents complete forgetfulness.
We propose that an individual receiver may be resistant
to learning from the sender. The willingness to learn is
controlled by yet another coefficient 0 ≤ w ≤ 1: w = 0 rep-
resents a “stubborn” individual who is not willing to learn;
w = 1 represents an enthusiastic knowledge adopter.
Operations on Assertions
In the process of learning, instances of assertions are com-
bined using the learning operator ⊕, which is defined below.
The operator affects assertion tuple components in dif-
ferent ways. The functionality of the operator satisfies the
following axioms:
1. For each assertion, there exists an instance of the as-
sertion with full knowledge, Ii = Ii{1, •};
2. For each assertion, there exists an instance of the as-
sertion with no knowledge, Oi = Oi{0, •};
3. Ai{k, •} ⊕ Oi = Ai{k, •} (learning an instance of an
assertion with no knowledge does not increase knowl-
edge);
4. Ai{k, •}⊕ Ii = Ii (an instance of an assertion with full
knowledge absorbs any other instance of the assertion);
5. Ai{kx, •} ⊕ Ai{ky, •} ≤ Ii (two instances of the same
assertions, when combined, do not create more knowl-
edge than it is possible);
The knowledge contained in two partial instances of
the same assertion Ai (k < 1) may or may not intersect
(Ax =“I know some quantum theory” and Ay =“I know
some quantum theory” do not necessarily refer to the same
“some.”) Therefore, combining them in the case of full over-
lap produces max (kx, ky) knowledge and in the case of least
overlap—min (1, kx + ky) knowledge. Assuming that both
cases are equally probable, the average combined knowledge
is given by the following equation:
kx⊕y =
max (kx, ky) +min (1, kx + ky)
2
. (3)
For the sake of simplicity, this piecewise linear function
can be approximated by a smooth function:
kx⊕y = kx + ky − kxky = kx + ky (1− kx) . (4)
A similar equation can be written for the new belief com-
ponent, except that the added belief is weighted by the cor-
responding knowledge to avoid having strong influence by
confident but not knowledgeable actors:
bx⊕y = bx + kyby (1± bx) . (5)
The sign in the parentheses depends on whether the added
belief is positive (“–”) or negative (“+”).
Here is the complete definition of the learning operator
for kx + ky > 0:
Aix ⊕ Aiy = {kx + ky (1− kx) , bx + kyby (1± bx)} . (6)
One can prove that this definition satisfies Axioms 1–5.
2.3 Popularity Model
The general popularity framework has been described by
Parkhurst & Hopmeyer [10] and Coie et al. [2]. They dis-
tinguish two types of popularity: sociometric popularity PS
and peer-perceived popularity PP . The sociometric popular-
ity of an actor is calculated in terms of the number of the ac-
tor’s friends FF and enemies EE. Sociometric popularity is
often expressed in terms of social preference SP = FF −EE
and social impact SI = FF + EE.
The perceived popularity is a measure of the actor’s so-
cial dominance or influence and is one of the components
of his utility. Perceived popularity can be high (PP = 1),
average (PP = 0) or low (PP = −1).
It follows from Table 1 in [10] that these two measures
of popularity are correlated:
P ≡ PP ∼ (FF/2− EE/10) ∼ FF. (7)
In other words, the perceived popularity of an actor is pro-
portional to the number of the actor’s friends (unless he has
a lot of enemies). The value of FF is easily computed (it
is the degree of a node representing the actor in a social
network graph) and can be used to estimate P .
In our model, we assume that a speaker or commenter
improves his popularity by posting assertions or comments.
Otherwise, the popularity gradually declines over time. This
means that the actors with a high publishing rate (the num-
ber of publications per unit time) will see a steady growth
of P and, according to Eq. (7), the corresponding growth
of the number of listeners. On the other hand, idle (silent)
actors will become less popular and will slowly lose listeners.
It is not clear yet if actors’ publishing rates and audience
growth rates in real social networks are indeed linearly cor-
related. However, we have some preliminary evidence based
on experiments with LiveJournal (a blogging Web site) that
this assumption may be at least partially true.
2.4 Trust Model
We define actor-to-actor trust 0 ≤ TXY ≤ 1 as a measure of
the extent to which actor X trusts the information provided
by another actor Y . If TXY = 0, then X disregards Y ’s
publications and comments. If TXY = 1, then X uncondi-
tionally accepts Y ’s publications and comments. In general,
TXY 6= T Y X and TXX = 1.
Each actor X has reputation RX = T YX , X 6= Y , which
is the average trust of all other actors in X. As we will
show in the next section, RX is one of the components of
X’s utility.
3 KNOWLEDGE AND FEEDBACK TRANSFER
In this section, we describe the knowledge transfer process
and the associated utility function. The transfer between the
sender and receivers involves learning, feedback, and utility
updating of all participating actors.
3.1 Utility and Personality
A single communication between the sender and the re-
ceivers consists of an exchange of at most one assertion (from
S to Rs) and up to N feedback messages. The communica-
tion intrinsically involves both actors considering their self-
perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity, which fur-
ther determine their decisions of whether or not to publish
the assertion in the first place and whether or not to provide
feedback. An actor’s self-perceived knowledge, reputation,
and popularity collectively form her utility. The weights an
actor puts on these three utility components characterize
this actor’s personality.
We believe that the purpose of a rational actor X is to
maximize her utility UX , defined as a convex combination
of knowledge, reputation, and popularity with coefficients
0 ≤ κ, ρ, pi ≤ 1, κ+ ρ+ pi = 1:
UX = κKX + ρRX + piPX . (8)
We use a particular set of coefficients {κ, ρ, pi} to charac-
terize a particular type of actors’ personality. For example,
κ = ρ = 0, pi = 1 describe a network of “Internet trolls”
(actors, for whom bloated popularity is the primary goal
of networking). On the other hand, κ = ρ = 0.5, pi = 0
probably corresponds to a scientific community of knowl-
edge seeking altruists who care about their reputation and
wisdom, but not about being quoted or even published.
In this paper, we focus on a homogeneous network where
all actors have the same utility function coefficients. We un-
derstand that in a real social network, actors are heteroge-
neous. We leave the heterogeneous network as future work.
3.2 Knowledge Transfer
Transferring knowledge about an assertion Ai from the
sender S to a receiver R involves combining the old re-
ceiver’s knowledge about this and possibly other correlated
assertions ARj , forgotten to a certain extent, with the newly
received knowledge ASi (in these equations, we treat tuple
Ai as a two-component vector):
ARj,(t+1) =
(
FARj,t
)
⊕
(
GijA
S
i,t +Hij
)
, j = 1 . . . |A|. (9)
Matrix F describes forgetfulness and is simply another
notation for Eq. (2). It reduces the value of each assertion
(both knowledge and belief are affected). This matrix is ap-
plied to all assertions held by the sender and by all receivers
at each time step, regardless of whether there was knowledge
transfer or not. F is defined as follows:
F =
[√
ζ 0
0
√
ζ
]
(10)
Altogether, the left operand of the learning operator in
Eq. (9) describes the knowledge deterioration.
Matrix G describes knowledge acceptance. It reduces
the quantity of knowledge in the transferred assertion ASi
by (1− w) due to the unwillingness to learn and reflects the
process of calculating the actual belief in the newly acquired
knowledge. The receiver accepts the amount of belief in the
assertion proportional to her trust in the sender. Note that
the coefficient mij from the ontology matrix M allows the
receiver to adjust beliefs of the assertions correlated with
ASi (including, naturally, the receiver’s instance of the trans-
ferred assertion, ARi ). G is defined as follows:
Gij =
[
wδij 0
0 mijT
RS
]
, δij =
{
0 if i 6= j,
1 if i = j.
(11)
The transferred assertion, as perceived by the corre-
sponding receiver, is GijA
S
i,t.
H is the vector of self-assessed knowledge. When the re-
ceiver does not have enough trust in the sender, she tries to
make an educated guess about the true nature of the trans-
ferred assertion ASi , based on her own knowledge, through
the ontology matrix M . The belief associated with ASi is
estimated as mkibRk —the average aggregate belief of the re-
ceiver weighted by the correlation coefficients. It is further
multiplied by mij to reflect the potential impact of the as-
sertion ASi on A
R
j (remember that mii = 1). Finally, only
a fraction of the estimated belief is taken into account, pro-
portional to the lack of trust of R in S:
Hij =
{
0, mij
(
1− TRS
)
mkibRk
}
(12)
There is no knowledge quantity transfer associated with
the self-assessment.
Thus, Eq. (9) explains how the receiver’s new knowledge
is formed by combining the receiver’s pre-existing (though
partially deteriorated) knowledge with a mix of the learned
knowledge and the receiver’s educated guess.
3.3 Trust and Popularity Calculation
As a result of the knowledge transfer, the values of trust,
reputation, and popularity of all involved actors also change.
The change of the sender’s popularity is calculated as
the average change of the receivers’ total knowledge caused
by the acceptance of the transferred assertion:
∆PS = |aR
i,(t+1) − aRi,t|. (13)
In other words, if the receivers learn nothing new from
the sender, his popularity does not change (in fact, in
our model an actor’s popularity decreases by the factor of
(1− δp) per time step if he or she neither publishes an as-
sertion nor provides feedback).
The change of a receiver’s trust in the sender is calculated
as the difference between the sender’s and the old receiver’s
perceptions of the transferred assertion:
∆TRS = 1− |bSi − bRi |. (14)
In other words, agreement (bSi = b
R
i ) improves trust, and
disagreement ruins it.
To make sure that neither trust nor popularity exceeds
1, we calculate the new values of P and T by combining
the old historical values and the increments. We use differ-
ent combination rules. Since popularity, according to our
model, is monotonically increasing (except when the actor
does not publish an assertion or feedback), we combine the
old popularity and the increment the same way we combine
knowledge in Eq. 4:
PSt+1 = P
S
t +∆P
S − PSt ∆PS. (15)
On the contrary, trust can both increase and decrease.
Coefficient ξ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of influence of trust history
on the future trust; ξ = 0 represents the case when the new
value of trust is calculated without looking at the history;
ξ = 1 means that the new value is taken directly from the
history (which makes it a constant):
TRSt+1 = ξT
RS
t + (1− ξ)∆TRS (16)
3.4 Feedback Transfer
The feedback transfer from the receivers to the sender is
similar to the transfer in the opposite direction, except that:
• the transferred assertion has no associated quantity of
knowledge (only belief, because it is a response to an-
other assertion) and
• the transfer does not cause the sender’s knowledge de-
terioration (because it happens at the same time step
as the original knowledge transfer).
The equations (10), (11), and (12) can be rewritten ac-
cordingly:
F =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(17)
Gij =
[
0 0
0 mijT
SR
]
(18)
Hij = [0, 0] (19)
Note that Eq. (18) uses the trust of the sender in the
receivers, TSR, not the other way around.
The trust and popularity changes for the receiver are cal-
culated using Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), with a suitable substi-
tutions S ↔ R and SR ↔ RS. When feedback is expected
from more than one receiver, the increments are applied to
the sender’s values in the order of the receivers’ occurrence
on the sender’s friend list.
4 GAME MATRIX
In the previous section, we gave a detailed analysis of the ba-
sic steps involved in the information transmission between
a sender and receivers, and described how the actors up-
date their utilities (including knowledge, trust, and popu-
larity) depending on whether or not assertions and feedback
messages are transmitted. However, we have not answered
this question yet: under what circumstances are the actors
willing to transmit assertions and send feedback? In this
section, we will address this question under the assumption
that all actors know that each of them attempts to maxi-
mize his or her own utility, and they are fully aware of the
impact on their own utilities from any combination of their
individual choices.
Such a strategic interaction between the actors can be
naturally modeled as a game with the actors being play-
ers. More specifically, the actors play a non-cooperative
non-zero-sum (N +1)-person rectangular game. The utility
changes of the players in the game are given by the (N +1)-
dimensional payoff matrix Msr1r2...rN (s, rk ∈ {1, 2}) and
depends on the strategies s and rk selected by the players:
the sender and the receivers. The cells of the matrix cor-
respond to the combinations of the available actions of the
actors. The sender has to choose between two actions:
S1: not to send an assertion,
S2: to send an assertion.
Each receiver has to choose between another two actions:
R1: not to provide feedback,
R2: to provide feedback (if possible).
Obviously, any combination of the form {S1, . . . , R2, . . .}
is infeasible: one cannot send feedback to an assertion that
has never been sent in the first place.
The solution of the resulting game (the Nash equilibrium:
the optimal combination of the actions, or strategies, for
each player) can be found using well-known game theoretical
methods (see, e.g., [8]).
It can be proved that from the sender’s point of view,
there is always exactly one optimal strategy (to forward or
not to forward)—a so-called pure strategy, regardless of the
personalities of the receivers. The proof is very similar to
the one presented in [15]. Unfortunately, in the presence
of more than one receiver, it is not possible to prove that
each receiver has an optimal pure strategy. Receivers may
be forced to alternate the available feedback strategies to
achieve a mixed Nash equilibrium. We can speculate that in
real life the number of communications between the sender
and the receivers is finite and that if they are substantially
spaced in time, each session can be treated as independent,
thus resulting in a pure-strategy game. In this case, the
strategies chosen by the players are not necessarily truly
optimal.
5 SIMULATION
To observe our model’s behavior, we simulated information
diffusion in a loose one-shot network of actors. The net-
work consisted of 100 unconnected members. One third of
the members (“gurus”) had high average knowledge of 0.9;
another third (“ignoramuses”) had low knowledge of 0.1; fi-
nally, the remaining members (“mediocres”) had medium
knowledge of 0.5. The number of facts in the system was
10.
At each simulation step, a random person from the pop-
ulation was chosen as the sender, and another N = 1 peo-
ple were chosen as receivers. The receivers were temporar-
ily connected to the sender. The sender and the receivers
would then play the information transmission game, select
the optimal strategy, and apply it to their states, thus up-
dating the values of ki, bi, a, T
RS, TSR, and P . After that,
the connections between the involved actors were severed.
At every 500th step, knowledge distribution in the network
was calculated and plotted against the simulation time. The
simulation was repeated 50,000 times.
We ran the experiment twice for populations with differ-
ent personalities. In the first case (Fig. 2), the actors had
high desire for reputation σ = 0.7, low desire for knowledge
κ = 0.2, and very low desire for popularity pi = 0.1. We
called these people “experts.”
In the second experiment, the actors had low expecta-
tions for reputation and knowledge κ = σ = 0.1 and strong
popularity lust pi = 0.8 (Fig. 3). We called them “trolls”
(this terminology was borrowed from [14, 15]).
As one can see from the figures, in both scenarios the
distribution of knowledge rapidly converges to a situation
where all network members become fully or almost fully
knowledgeable (a ≈ 1). In the network of “trolls” full con-
vergence takes less time than in the network of “experts”
(though, presumably, the quality of knowledge in the former
network is substantially lower). Also, the “expert” network
actually never fully converged to the full-knowledge state,
always having some unsubstantial number of people doubt-
ing the diffused facts.
Another interesting difference between the two scenarios
is the initial convergence of “trolls” to a medium-knowledge
state, from where they proceed to the total-knowledge state.
This means that in a “troll” community, actors absorb as-
sertions without properly evaluating them. As a result,
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Figure 2: Knowledge diffusion in a network of “experts.”
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Figure 3: Knowledge diffusion in a network of “trolls.”
“smarter” actors become “more stupid,” and “stupid” actors
become “smarter,” before the entire population becomes
“smarter” as a whole.
The number of simultaneous receivers N dramatically af-
fected the convergence speed (more listeners result in faster
convergence), but did not change the structure of the con-
vergence.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we extended a previously developed game the-
oretical model of information dissemination in a star-like
network with one sender and N receivers. The model takes
into account several personal traits of actors (the desire
for knowledge, reputation, and popularity). The feedback
mechanism is used to control the reputation of information
senders and deter them from distributing unconfirmed ru-
mors.
The model is mathematically represented by an (N +1)-
player non-zero sum, non-cooperative game, where the avail-
able actions are to forward an assertion or hold it indefinitely
and to provide feedback on received assertions or not.
To improve and generalize our model, we propose the
following future research directions:
• Consider the variability of κ, ρ, and pi for different ac-
tors in a network.
• Explore a connection between popularity P , reputation
R (or trust T ), and knowledge A and selected charac-
teristics of real massive online social networks.
• Develop a mechanism of preferential attachment in so-
cial networks based on mutual utility gain from infor-
mation exchange.
• Study the adaptation process that allows actors to
change their κ, ρ, and pi parameters in order to maxi-
mize utility.
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